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Turning Cash into Votes: The Law and 
Economics of Campaign Contributions 
Brett Silverberg* 
As a result of the recent Citizens United decision and its “Super 
PAC” spawn, individuals, corporations, and unions are allowed 
to independently spend unlimited amounts to influence elections. 
The ramifications of the Citizens United ruling have seemingly 
had a grave impact on the 2016 Presidential Election. In addition 
to examining the laws—and their loopholes—of political 
campaign contributions, this Essay will also explore the 
economics of campaign contributions. Ultimately, there are two 
reasons as to why corporations provide such large sums of money: 
one is rent creation, which is the attempt to gain political favors 
for “special interests;” the second is rent extraction, which is an 
attempt to avoid political disfavors. As the behavior of candidates 
continues to resemble the practices of bribery and extortion, 
campaign finance reform efforts are likely to become more 
aggressive—in an effort to curb corruption, or the appearance of 
corruption. Moreover, in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, the 
Court may consider revisiting and overturning Citizens United. 
As such, this Essay will investigate potential solutions to combat 
the lax campaign finance laws. 
   
                                                                                                             
 *  J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2018, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., 2013, 
University of Michigan. The author would like to thank Professor Fred McChesney for his 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
[Lobbyists] are not people who are [giving money] 
because they like the color of [Jeb Bush’s] hair . . . 
[Lobbyists] are highly sophisticated killers. And when 
they give five million dollars, or two million, or a million 
to Jeb, they have him just like a puppet. He’ll do whatever 
they want. He is their puppet.1 
In the wake of the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC,2 the 
floodgates have opened for unlimited amounts of money to be funneled 
into political campaigns.3 As such, there is a growing sentiment that the 
political candidate who raises the most money is at a competitive 
advantage over the field of candidates with respect to winning an election.4 
                                                                                                             
1 Philip Bump, Donald Trump Says He’d Be ‘Obligated’ to Big Donors. But He’s 
Raising Money from Them., THE WASH. POST: THE FIX (Aug. 25, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/25/donald-trump-says-pols-
are-beholden-to-big-donors-so-why-is-he-raising-super-pac-funds/ (quoting Donald  
Trump). 
2 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
3 See Beth Rowen, Super PACs Explained, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/us/
government/super-pacs.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2016). 
4 See Wesley Lowery, 91% of the Time the Better-Financed Candidate Wins. Don’t Act 
Surprised., THE WASH. POST: THE FIX (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ne
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The 2008 Presidential Election reinforced the truism that money wins 
elections, as President Obama amassed a nearly two-to-one monetary 
advantage over Senator John McCain.5 Indeed, conventional wisdom is 
that money wins elections because money allows candidates to spend on 
advertising, which ultimately translates to votes.6 
Campaign spending, however, has not always been as influential in 
elections as conventional wisdom holds. In the pre-Citizens United era, 
candidates had to adhere to more stringent campaign finance laws and 
accept limited contributions from donors.7 From 1976 to the early 2000s, 
most presidential candidates relied on the public funding program to 
subsidize their campaigns.8 Through the imposition of strict spending 
limits, the presidential public funding program reduced the fundraising 
frenzy that now surrounds presidential races, enabling candidates without 
access to large sums of money to still run viable campaigns.9 As a result 
of Citizens Untied and the proliferation of Super PACs, however, 
presidential candidates have instead chosen to fund their campaigns with 
private contributions to avoid being subjected to the strict spending limits 
imposed by the presidential public funding program.10 
Now six years removed from the Citizens United decision and in the 
midst of the 2016 Presidential Race, “[b]ehind-the-scenes jockeying to 
raise big bucks from bundlers connected to super-PACs and third-party 
groups is well underway.”11 The cost of campaigning has risen to new 
heights, as fundraising experts have predicted that the total cost of the 2016 
Presidential Campaign will reach $5 billion—almost double the cost of the 
                                                                                                             
ws/the-fix/wp/2014/04/04/think-money-doesnt-matter-in-elections-this-chart-says-youre-
wrong/. 
5 Jeb Bush’s 2016 presidential campaign, however, casts doubt on this truism. See 
Ashley Killough, Jeb Bush’s Doomed Campaign, CNN POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com
/2016/02/21/politics/jeb-bushs-doomed-campaign/ (last updated Feb. 22, 2016, 11:56 
AM). 
6 See Philip Bump, Does More Campaign Money Actually Buy More Votes: An 
Investigation, THE WIRE (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:45 PM), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013
/11/does-more-campaign-money-actually-buy-more-votes-investigation/71473/ 
(portraying the correlation between spending differential and voter differential). 
7 See Aliyah Frumin, Money Has Too Much of an Influence in Politics, Americans Say, 
MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/money-has-too-much-influence-politics-say-am
ericans (last updated June 2, 2015, 9:12 PM). 
8 See The Presidential Public Funding Program, FEC (Apr. 1993), 
http://www.fec.gov/info/pfund.htm. 
9 Id. 
10 See Tarini Parti, Will 2012 Be the End of the Presidential Public Financing System?, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/08/the-end-of-
presidential-public-financing/. 
11 Amie Parnes & Kevin Cirilli, The $5 Billion Presidential Campaign?, THE HILL (Jan. 
21, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/230318-the-5-bi
llion-campaign. 
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2012 Presidential Campaign.12 Unsurprisingly, spending by outside 
groups has ballooned during the three federal election cycles following 
Citizens United.13 Given that candidates now have to compete with the 
messages and money spent by Super PACs, political appetites for 
campaign contributions are even more voracious. Using President 
Obama’s 2012 re-election campaign as a benchmark, candidates must 
raise $1.1 billion to meet the cost of a winning presidential campaign.14 
Acknowledging the trend in the deregulation of campaign finance, former 
Senator Robert Byrd states, “[t]he incessant money chase that currently 
permeates every crevice of our political system is like an unending circular 
marathon . . . .And it is a race that sends a clear message to people that it 
is money, money, money—not ideas, not principles, but money—that 
reigns supreme in American politics.”15 
This begs the following question: are the current campaign 
contribution limits enough to prevent corporations from having a 
corrupting influence—through independent expenditures—on federal 
officeholders? Indeed, as big money continues to flow through the political 
process, the appearance of corruption has become a growing concern given 
that it both suggests a high likelihood of actual corruption, and results in 
the erosion of public trust in the government.16 Implicit in this notion is 
that politicians are neglecting the common good in favor of special interest 
groups. At the first 2016 Democratic presidential debate, Senator Bernie 
Sanders vehemently asserted that as a result of Citizens United, “our 
campaign finance system is corrupt and is undermining American 
democracy. Millionaires and billionaires are pouring unbelievable sums of 
money into the political process in order to fund super PACs and to elect 
candidates who represent their interests, not the interests of the working 
people.”17 The overarching point of Senator Sanders’ argument is that 
                                                                                                             
12 Id. 
13 Outside groups spent over $330 million in the presidential campaign preceding 
Citizens United. In contrast, in the first presidential election following Citizens United, 
outside groups spent over $600 million and collected over $800 million in contributions. 
See Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions after Mccutcheon, Citizens 
United, and SpeechNow 26-28 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch.: Pub. Law and Legal Theory 
Working Papers, Paper No. 485, 2014), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcont
ent.cgi?article=1945&context=public_law_and_legal_theory. 
14 See Parti, supra note 10. 
15 Major Garrett, Money, Politics, and the First Amendment (Cato Inst. Briefing Papers, 
Paper No. 30, 1997), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/bp030.pdf. 
16 ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 55 (2014). 
17 Full Transcript: Democratic Presidential Debate, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 14, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/us/politics/democratic-debate-transcript.html
?_r=0. 
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because of Citizens United, Wall Street now regulates Congress—as 
opposed to vice versa.18 Nonetheless, given the recent passing of Justice 
Scalia, who was part of the 5-4 majority that ruled in favor of striking 
down the ban on corporate independent expenditures, there is a greater 
likelihood that the Court will choose to revisit, and perhaps overrule, 
Citizens United.19 
II. PAY TO PLAY: THE ECONOMICS BEHIND CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Imagine a scene out of the television drama House of Cards, where 
political candidates spend the majority of their time courting millionaires 
and billionaires behind closed doors—instead of allocating the time to 
meet with constituents—in an effort to solicit campaign contributions.20 
Indeed, these types of encounters between candidates and wealthy 
individuals seem to be commonplace, especially at the beginning of 
election cycles.21 But, what exactly is being discussed—or better yet, 
exchanged—behind these closed doors? 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, money does not actually buy 
elections.22 Money does, however, buy politicians—even if the politicians 
do not intend to be bought.23 The public perception is that elective offices 
are sold to the highest bidder, and campaign contributions are the 
                                                                                                             
18 Id. 
19 This notion will be further explored in Section V. 
20 See Jonathan Soros, Soros: Big Money Can’t Buy Elections – Influence is Something 
Else, REUTERS: THE GREAT DEBATE (Feb. 10, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate
/2015/02/09/soros-there-is-no-idyllic-pre-citizens-united-era-to-return-to/ (“The quest for 
campaign cash suffuses political life. Candidates in competitive elections can spend more 
than 60 percent of their time raising money.”). 
21 See DAVID MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: CONGRESSIONAL 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 66 (1990) (“Early money is generally considered especially 
important, not only because it helps pay for necessary polling and research, staff, 
organizing and planning, and developing a media strategy, but because it works to establish 
credibility, which in turn helps to secure funding for the latter stages of the campaign.”). 
22 See Bump, supra note 1; see also Stephen J. Dubner, How Much Does Campaign 
Spending Influence the Election? A Freakonomics Quorum, FREAKONOMICS (Jan. 17, 2012, 
9:40 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2012/01/17/how-much-does-campaign-spending-
influence-the-election-a-freakonomics-quorum/ (illustrating that candidate spending has 
diminishing marginal returns and is an inadequate predictor of success). 
23 “A wealthy individual or entity could threaten to bankroll a large Super PAC working 
against an elected official up for reelection in the event that official acts inconsistently with 
the wealthy individual or entity’s interests. Even without an explicit threat or quid pro quo, 
an elected official could be influenced out of fear that the wealthy individuals or entities 
will bankroll her opposition.” Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, 
and the Proxy War Over Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 9 (2014) 
(footnote omitted). 
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functional equivalent of bribes.24 Correspondingly, many experts have 
theorized that big check donors are driven by business and ego, and they 
contribute to ideologically like-minded candidates who are beholden to 
lobbyists, donors, and special interests.25 But, what exactly are these big 
check donors paying for? The myopic view is that private interest 
contributions purport to buy access and influence, which can be leveraged 
for political favors.26 Although this view is not incorrect, it is only partially 
the answer.27 The other part of the answer—which is frequently 
overlooked—is that contributions “to politicians often are made not for 
particular political favors, but to avoid particular political disfavor.”28 
Economists have arrived at the realization “that, as a strictly positive 
matter, government regulation ha[s] the power to create benefits that [are] 
unavailable other than through politics, or [are] more cheaply available 
through politics.”29 These benefits are referred to as “rents,” a term that 
“economists apply to any return obtained by virtue of controlling a scarce 
or unique factor of production.”30 Together, the rent creation and rent 
extraction economic models of regulatory activity, which are both based 
on payments to politicians in exchange for services, explain why private 
interests are paying, and what they are paying for.31 In a nutshell, both 
concepts are driven by political self-interest, where politicians—the 
“suppliers” of such rents—seek to maximize their total returns “by 
equating at the margin the returns from votes, contributions, bribes, power, 
and other sources of personal gain. All these, in turn, are positive functions 
not only of private benefits [politicians] confer[,] but also of private costs 
[they] agre[e] not to impose.”32 While the two models of regulatory 
activity need not be mutually exclusive, “a combined strategy of rent 
creation and rent extraction is not necessarily optimal to politicians.”33 
                                                                                                             
24 See Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 
52 (David R. Henderson ed., 2d ed. 2007). 
25 See Transcript of CNN Newsroom from 10:00 – 11:00 AM ET, CNN (Dec. 26, 2015), 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1512/26/cnr.02.html. 
26 FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND 
POLITICIAN EXTORTION 2 (1997). 
27 See id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 9-10. 
30 Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 562 
(1969). 
31 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 2, 53. 
32 Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 105 (1987). 
33 Id. at 110. 
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A.  Legalized Bribery: The Concept of Rent Creation 
Rent creation is the orthodox economic theory of regulation.34 When 
rent seeking is extended to rent creation, there are three seeming 
propositions that follow: (1) you have to “pay to play,” as politicians will 
not provide something for nothing; (2) parties who contribute to politicians 
are purchasing special treatment, which comes at the expense of those who 
are not paying enough; and (3) by examining the extent to which parties 
“pay to play,” one can identify the parties receiving special treatment.35 
In short, the rent creation economic model can be explained in the 
following manner: “[i]f expected political rents net of the costs of 
organizing and procuring favorable regulation are positive, then producers 
will demand—pay for—regulation. If payments sufficient to compensate 
politicians for the costs of creating regulation are forthcoming, they will 
supply it.”36 This model takes into account that there is a market for 
regulation as there is for any other economic good; the market, however, 
is an auction market, “where various groups of potential winners and 
losers vie for the amounts and kinds of rent creation that government can 
supply.”37 The rent creation model further posits the rule that regulation is 
acquired by the donor and is designed and operated primarily for the 
donor’s benefit.38 The more inelastic industry demand is for the regulation, 
the greater the relative attraction of political rent creation.39 Accordingly, 
“if industry supply is perfectly elastic, there is no producers’ surplus and 
so no opportunity for rent extraction. On the other hand, when industry 
demand is perfectly elastic, extraction of private rents is the only plausible 
political strategy.”40 
Indeed, the rent creation model presupposes that there is an exchange 
between the politician and the donor.41 As such, the two contracting parties 
discuss what benefits the politician can provide the donor, and what the 
costs are of obtaining those benefits.42 In such an exchange, the politician 
demands either votes or money, and in return offers a monopoly profit as 
consideration.43 Although this arrangement appears to be a win-win for 
                                                                                                             
34 Id. at 104. 
35 See “Pay to Play” Politics Examined, With Lessons for Campaign-Finance Reform, 
FPO (Jan. 1. 2002), http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Independent-Review/84017
560.html 
36 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 9. 
37 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 16. 
38 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 9. 
39 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 35. 
40 Id. 
41 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 9. 
42 Id. 
43 See McChesney, supra note 32, at 104. 
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both sides, competition for the monopoly profit “produces additional 
social loss from rent-seeking.”44 From a welfare economics standpoint, 
society bears the burden of the excessive regulation costs—especially 
when opportunity costs are considered—that flow from the demonstrated 
opportunistic behavior by politicians and their consumers.45 
Applying the rent creation model to the context of campaign 
contributions, donors are paying for access and influence, which they 
leverage for regulations favorable to their particular interests. Rent-
seeking efforts by big check donors can range from lobbying for public 
subsidies in order to be given wealth that has already been created, to 
imposing regulations on competitors, thereby enabling the donor to 
command a greater market share.46 By virtue of giving large campaign 
contributions to induce political action, private interests groups are 
essentially bribing candidates in an effort to capture the rents.47 Absent 
explicit quid pro quo agreements, campaign contributions can still 
effectively function as “implicit bribes.”48 Presumably, the larger the 
contribution given to the candidate, the likelier it becomes that the 
candidate will exercise his or her discretionary power to create and allocate 
rents to benefit the donor, provided that the candidate takes office.49 Given 
that there is no guarantee a candidate will win an election, however, donors 
could potentially see no return on their investments; but such a risk is a 
necessary undertaking if the donors desire to “pay to play” the rent-seeking 
game and reap the potential rewards.50 
                                                                                                             
44 Id. 
45 “The complete cost of all rent seeking activities is the summation of resources 
exhausted in seeking rents plus the consumer surplus that could be created if rent seeking 
resources were switched to productive endeavors.” See Tyler Cowen & Alexander 
Tabarrok, The Opportunity Costs of Rent Seeking, ALEX TABARROCK, https://mason.gmu.
edu/~atabarro/TheOpportunityCostsofRentSeeking.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2016). 
46 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 14-15 (depicting the economics behind the 
“raising-rivals’-cost model”). 
47 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 22. 
48 See generally Brian F. Jordan, Disclosing Bribes in Disguise: Campaign 
Contributions as Implicit Bribery and Enforcing Violations Impartially, 17 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1435 (2015). 
49 See Hasen, supra note 23, at 4 (“Some supporters of [contribution] limits worry not 
just about outright bribery, but also that, thanks to human nature and feelings of reciprocity, 
candidates who receive extremely large contributions will feel grateful to large donors and 
will take legislative and other steps to favor the donors.”); see also Garrick B. Pursley, The 
Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY L.J. 781, 820-22 (2014) (“As 
independent expenditures have become functionally equivalent to direct contributions, we 
should expect them to generate influence for donors proportional to their amounts.”). 
50 See, e.g., Emily Flitter, Why U.S. Billionaires May Not Be Able to Buy the 2016 
Election, REUTERS (June 2, 2016, 10:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
election-billionaires-idUSKBN0OI07120150602 (stating billionaire Sheldon Adelson 
contributed more than $100 million in 2012 to unsuccessful political campaigns). 
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From the public’s perspective, it is the economic model of rent 
creation that engenders concerns over the looming presence of big money 
in campaigns, as special interest groups continue to come away as the 
winners of the “pay to play” rent-seeking game.51 Concerns over the 
implicit relationships forged between candidates and campaign 
contributors coincide with the notion that the selling of access gives rise 
to the appearance of corruption.52 The Court has held, however, that 
spending money to “garner influence over or access to” elected officials 
does not create quid pro quo corruption.53 While it is seemingly 
conceivable that rent creation can be treated as a source of corruption in 
the form of usurpation of public power for private gains, the Court remains 
unwilling to impose sanctions for implicit agreements involving campaign 
contributions—effectually incentivizing the formation of rent-creation 
contracts.54 Nevertheless, as the law continues to allow agreements 
involving money in exchange for political favors, rent-creation contracts 
will continue to arouse public revulsion.55 Given that such agreements are 
legal, however, Congress would have to enact legislation if it intends to 
deter the formation of rent-creation contracts. 
B. Political Extortion: The Concept of Rent Extraction 
As Professor Fred McChesney explains in Money For Nothing: 
Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion, the rent creation 
model cannot stand alone, as it is part of a larger economic theory of 
regulation based upon rent extraction—a theory that has seldom been 
considered.56 Moreover, among the inherent flaws in the rent creation 
model is the following: the model treats politicians as rational individuals 
who seek to maximize their own personal welfare, and in so doing, fails to 
give credence to the view that politicians attempt to maximize utility.57 In 
                                                                                                             
51 See McChesney, supra note 35, at 348, 351. 
52 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297-98 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
53 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1450-51; 1462 (2014) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976)). 
54 See Brian F. Jordan, supra note 48, at passim. This issue will be further discussed in 
Section IV. 
55 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 54 (“[T]he popular revulsion against paying 
politicians presupposes that payments are made for special favors, since the calls for reform 
constantly focus on limiting what individuals can give—not the total of what politicians 
can take.”). 
56 See McChesney, supra note 32, at 102; see also Douglas Ginsburg, A New Economic 
Theory of Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather Than Rent Creation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1771, 
1773 (1999) (reviewing FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT 
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICIAN EXTORTION (1997)). 
57 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 17. 
120 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:111 
 
this sense, the rent creation model implicitly treats politicians as passive 
brokers, who wait for rent seekers to approach them to begin a rent-
creation auction, and redistribute wealth in response to competing private 
demands.58 Such a misconception, however, ignores the fact that 
politicians “actively see[k] votes, campaign contributions, and other forms 
of recompense, contracting to receive a supply of goods or services from 
private parties in response to [the politicians’] demands.”59 Furthermore, 
the rent creation model is also deficient in two other related aspects: (1) it 
does not examine ways other than rent creation that a politician can obtain 
benefits from private parties, and (2) it fails to consider how politicians are 
able to gain not by creating rents for some, but rather by causing losses to 
others.60 
Contrary to popular belief, a politician has alternative ways to engage 
private parties in exchange.61 Depending on market conditions, a politician 
may demand votes or money in exchange for a monopoly profit, as in the 
rent creation economic model; however, “a politician may also make his 
demands on private parties, not by promising benefits, but by threatening 
to impose costs—a form of political extortion.”62 The latter strategy, which 
essentially amounts to political blackmail, epitomizes the economic model 
of rent extraction.63 As long as the expected cost of the “act threatened 
exceeds the value of the consideration that the private parties must give up 
to avoid legislative action,” rational private parties will be just as willing 
to surrender the tribute demanded of them to avoid the imposition of costs 
as they would be to pay legislators to have rents created, provided that 
marginal utility of wealth is constant.64 Indeed, bribery and extortion are 
the two forms of interactions observed in the world that enable politicians 
to elicit large contributions—aside from contributions tied to altruistic 
motives.65 Unlike the model of rent creation, however, the model of rent 
extraction is able to answer the overarching question: “[h]ow does a 
politician gain from imposing net losses?”66 
The basic notion of rent extraction is ultimately quite simple. Given 
that political office confers a property right not just to create rents, but also 
to impose costs that would destroy private rents, politicians can legally 
                                                                                                             
58 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 18. 
59 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 17. 
60 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 18-19. 
61 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 21-22. 
62 Id. 
63 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 22-23. 
64 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 22. 
65 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 21-23. 
66 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 19. 
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extract wealth from private parties.67 Unlike the rent creation model, the 
rent extraction model focuses primarily on politicians, and views them as 
independent actors making their own demands on private parties.68 In 
short, by first threatening to exercise their rights to impose burdensome 
restrictions on private actors “and then by forbearing from the 
expropriation of private rents already in existence,” politicians stand to 
gain by means of extortion payments.69 In this sense, “rent extraction—
receiving payments not to take or destroy private wealth—is ‘money for 
nothing.’”70 As opposed to politically created rents, the private rents 
described in this economic model “represent returns to their owners’ 
entrepreneurial ability and firm-specific private investments.”71 Unlike the 
payments made in the rent creation model, the payments made in the rent 
extraction model are aimed at protecting existing rents.72 Indeed, a 
politician threatening to expropriate private wealth is paid to allow 
consumers to continue earning returns on capital they have already 
invested for themselves.73 Because “[t]he passage of sharply focused taxes 
and regulations will reduce the returns that private capital owners receive 
from their skills and investments[,]” private owners are incentivized to 
strike bargains with politicians in order to protect their returns, provided 
that “the side payments to politicians are lower than the expected losses 
from compliance with the threatened law.”74 This begs the question: after 
identifying private capital stocks whose returns will come out of 
producers’ surplus, how can a politician extract a share of that surplus?75 
There are ultimately two different methods of extracting private rents 
that politicians have at their disposal. Seemingly, the more prominent and 
preferred strategy of the two is to first threaten, and then forbear from 
expropriating private rents already created, as previously discussed. The 
strategy of cost forbearance, however, can assume several forms.76 
Perhaps the most blatant form is the threat of price controls aiming to 
deregulate a previously cartelized industry.77 For example, the threat of 
implementing a price ceiling, which mandates prices below the level of 
the prevailing market price, could induce the targeted firms to pay for 
                                                                                                             
67 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 41. 
68 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 19. 
69 See id. 
70 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 3. 
71 McChesney, supra note 32, at 102. 
72 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 35. 
73 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at.26. 
74 McChesney, supra note 32, at 102. 
75 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 26. 
76 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 23. 
77 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 26-27. 
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regulatory forbearance.78 In such a scenario, it behooves the firms to pay 
in order to prevent potential dilution of their market shares. Additionally, 
instead of threatening to institute an industry-wide price reduction, 
politicians can threaten to increase costs.79 Regulations that threaten to 
impose additional costs on private firms could include any of the following 
measures: enacting excise taxes; placing costly reporting requirements on 
financial service firms; and mandating benefit payments on insurance 
firms.80 Any one of these examples would presumably “elicit offers of 
payment from affected producers in exchange for [the politician] 
withdrawing the proposed [legislation].”81 Political opportunities for rent 
extraction abound because valuable specific capital is an inevitable by-
product of a firm’s financial activities.82 Nevertheless, rent extraction in 
any context “can succeed only to the extent that threats to expropriate 
private rents are credible.”83 
Alternatively, politicians are able to extract rents not just by 
threatening to impose costs and subsequently forbearing, but also by 
actually enacting regulation to create a demand for them to mitigate the 
costs.84 On the one hand, “politicians can always legislate now and sell 
repeal later.”85 On the other hand, to make credible and convincing threats 
to reduce others’ capital, it may be necessary at times for politicians to 
intervene and enact legislation to extract private rents from those who fail 
to pay.86 In this regard, the use of specialized agencies to impose costs 
could help the politician generate greater credibility.87 In addition to 
providing politicians with market insights, the bureaucrats can take 
responsibility for threatened government intervention; despite working on 
behalf of the politician, the bureaucrats will be perceived by some voters 
as independent actors.88 In a sense, this illusion masks the politician’s 
opportunistic behavior. As such, the bureaucrats can impose costs on 
private parties, and in so doing they create opportunities for politicians to 
extract concessions from affected consumers looking to buy legislative 
repeal.89 
                                                                                                             
78 Id. 
79 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 29. 
80 McChesney, supra note 32, at 116. 
81 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 26-27. 
82 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 41. 
83 McChesney, supra note 32, at 109. 
84 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 37. 
85 MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 39. 
86 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 39. 
87 See id. 
88 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 37. 
89 One such example of this arrangement is the FTC’s “Used Car Rule,” where the FTC 
promulgated a rule—at Congress’ request—to impose costly auto-defect disclosure 
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Applying the rent extraction model to the context of campaign 
contributions, it seems that the attitudes of candidates are more in keeping 
with the rent extraction model as opposed to the rent creation model. In 
other words, it would be preposterous to think that candidates are passive 
players in the rent-seeking game—a presupposition of the rent creation 
model.90 Candidates’ attitudes unequivocally reflect an active need to raise 
money and seek out campaign contributors.91 Moreover, viewed through 
the lens of rent extraction, candidates would seek out contributions in 
return for future regulatory inaction, provided that they take office. 
Candidates are incentivized to uphold their promises because if they fail 
to do so, their campaign contributors will take their money and vote 
elsewhere in the next election cycle. Assuming a non-incumbent candidate 
wins an election and takes office, however, any contributions given to the 
newly elected official to honor the contracts previously negotiated would 
yield no rents.92 Rather, such contributions would protect against 
unforeseen costs that the newly elected official could otherwise impose.93 
Given that rent creation is to rent extraction as bribery is to extortion, 
the rent creation game is certainly more desirable from the perspective of 
producers.94 Needless to say, the rent extraction game is not one that is 
conducive to buying special treatment in the political marketplace. Private 
parties instead are compelled to pay to avoid wealth expropriation. 
Although the politician personally benefits from either creating or 
extracting private rents, the two strategies have strikingly different 
implications for private actors. “Of course, producers themselves would 
rather buy new rents than pay to protect their own existing rents.”95 In 
some markets, however, opportunities for rent creation may be slight 
compared to the opportunities for rent extraction.96 Nevertheless, it is the 
politician who has the power to decide what game will be played: rent 
creation or rent extraction. 
                                                                                                             
requirements. “On promulgation of the rule, used-car dealers and their trade association 
descended on Congress, spending large sums of money for relief from the proposed rule’s 
costs. When the concessions were forthcoming, Congress vetoed the very rule it had 
ordered.” McChesney, supra note 32, at 114. 
90 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 17-18. 
91 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 47. 
92 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 26, at 23. 
93 See id. 
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III. CURRENT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LAWS: THE 
BACK DOOR IS OPEN 
The intended purpose of campaign finance laws is to protect American 
democracy from corruption, and preserve the integrity of elections.97 Yet, 
current campaign finance laws are a farce: they have the deceiving 
appearance of imposing strict limits, but in reality the laws are littered with 
loopholes and the limits are easily circumvented.98 At the heart of the 
campaign finance “loophole” is the distinction drawn between campaign 
contributions and campaign expenditures.99 
Dating back to 1976, Buckley v. Valeo’s contribution-expenditure 
distinction has been the touchstone of the campaign finance framework.100 
In Buckley, the Court held that the First Amendment protects both political 
contributions and political expenditures.101 Moreover, the Court 
invalidated several sections of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA), as amended in 1974, that placed limits on campaign contributions 
to candidates, campaign expenditures, and on expenditures by individuals 
or organizations so long as the expenditures were not coordinated with any 
political candidates.102 Although the Court in Buckley upheld the 
contribution limits to prevent quid pro quo corruption, or its appearance, 
the Court struck down the limits placed on independent expenditures 
because such limits did not implicate the government’s interest in 
preventing corruption.103 The Buckley decision, however, led to the 
                                                                                                             
97 See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, For Campaign Contributions by the Wheelbarrow, the Back 
Door Is Open, WASH. POST (May 20, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
tent/article/2008/05/19/AR2008051902172.html (quoting Taylor Lincoln) (“Campaign 
finance limits are supposed to prevent the undue influence of big contributors.”). 
98 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (The 
majority’s opinion “creates a loophole that will allow a single individual to contribute 
millions of dollars to a political party or to a candidate’s campaign.”). 
99 See Todd Paulson & David Schultz, Bucking Buckley: Voter Attitudes, Tobacco 
Money, and Campaign Contribution Corruption in Minnesota Politics, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. 
L. & POL’Y 449, 453 (1998) (Due to a lack of restrictions upon expenditures, wealthy 
individuals would be able to subvert contribution limits, rendering the latter meaningless). 
100 J. Robert Abraham, Saving Buckley: Creating A Stable Campaign Finance 
Framework, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1078 (2010). 
101 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
102 Paulson & Schultz, supra note 99, at 449-50. 
103 See Paulson, supra note 99, at 449-50.; see also Jordan May, “Are We Corrupt 
Enough Yet?” The Ambiguous Quid Pro Quo Corruption Requirement in Campaign 
Finance Restrictions, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 357, 370-71 (2015) (“Buckley distinguished 
campaign contributions from expenditures because expenditures lacked prearrangement 
and coordination that could give rise to a quid pro quo arrangement.”). 
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unforeseen “soft money” loophole that enabled parties and candidates to 
circumvent the FECA’s contribution limits.104 
While the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) closed the 
“soft money” loophole, the influence of “soft money” on elections has 
since been displaced by the influence of Super PACs and independent 
expenditures on elections in the post-Citizens United era.105 Indeed, the 
Citizens United ruling changed campaign finance law, shifting campaign 
finance jurisprudence in a deregulatory direction.106 The decision 
reaffirmed the limits placed on contributions; however, the Court 
overturned its own precedent by holding that regulations prohibiting non-
party organizations (such as for-profit corporations and unions) from 
making independent expenditures for electioneering communications are 
unconstitutional abridgements of the First Amendment right to free 
speech.107 Consequently, the longstanding ban on direct corporate 
spending on campaigns has been lifted, and corporations are now free to 
spend as much as they want to generate influence and help elect or defeat 
candidates.108 Given the unregulated nature of outside spending, the 
question that now arises in the aftermath of Citizens United is whether 
large independent expenditures generate more influence on campaigns 
than direct campaign contributions? 
As it currently stands, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
contribution limits allow individuals to donate a maximum of $5,400 
directly to candidates—$2,700 for the primary and $2,700 for the general 
election—and up to $33,400 per year to a national party committee’s 
general fund.109 In addition, individuals can donate $5,000 per year to a 
                                                                                                             
104 See Jeffrey P. Geiger, Preparing for 2006: A Constitutional Argument for Closing the 
527 Soft Money Loophole, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 309, 319 (2005) (Political party 
activities, such as “sham issue advocacy,” were exempt from hard money limits, and by 
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individuals). 
105 See Pursley, supra note 49, at 815 (After the BCRA’s ban on parties’ use of soft 
money was upheld in McConnell v. FEC, many “soft money” donors shifted their 
contributions from the parties to outside groups unaffiliated with the parties.). 
106 See May, supra note 103, at 369 (Citizens United rejected the Rehnquist line of cases 
because they were inconsistent with the Court’s original intention in Buckley.); see also 
SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (following the 
precedent established by Citizens United and holding that limits on contributions to groups 
that make independent expenditures are unconstitutional). 
107 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 877 (2010).  
108 See The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html?_r=1&scp=31&sq=citizens%20united&st=cse. 
109 See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CITIZENS GUIDE (2004), http://www.fec.gov/pages/broc
hures/citizens.shtml. 
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Political Action Committee (“PAC”).110 On the other hand, individuals, 
corporations, and unions can contribute unlimited sums of money to Super 
PACs; unlike PACs, Super PACs are not subject to contribution limits 
because they cannot contribute directly to candidates.111 Accordingly, 
Super PACs are subject to two other limitations: (1) they cannot coordinate 
directly with candidates,112 and (2) they must report their expenditures and 
contributors to the FEC.113 Despite these restrictions, there are loopholes 
in both the coordination and disclosure laws. As such, the coordination 
and disclosure laws have inadvertently created backdoor funding 
channels—effectually rendering the current contribution limits 
meaningless.114 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTION LAWS 
A. Joint Fundraising: Do Candidates and Super PACs Actually 
Operate at Arm’s Length? 
In addition to the First Amendment, the Court’s basis for nullifying 
independent expenditure limits—allowing Super PACs to roam free—is 
predicated on the notion that private interest groups operate independently 
of the candidates they support.115 Because Super PACs are “independent,” 
the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting their 
spending.116 This notion, however, is misguided and warrants 
reconsideration, given the rapid emergence of single-candidate Super 
                                                                                                             
110 Id. 
111 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014) (discussing distinction between 
PACs and Super PACs). 
112 See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B) (2012) (Any Super PAC expenditure that is 
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a legally allowed “expenditure.”). 
113 See Center for Competitive Politics, Super PACs, http://www.campaignfreedom.org/
external-relations/super-pacs/ (last visited February 2, 2016). 
114 This notion will be further explored in the next section. See, e.g., Katla McGlynn, Jon 
Stewart, Stephen Colbert Expose More Super PAC Loopholes Without ‘Coordinating,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/18/jon-stew
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115 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 902 (2010) (“[T]he 
independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in 
stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process [because] [t]he 
absence of prearrangement and coordination . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures 
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”). 
116 See id. 
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PACs.117 Absent restrictions on independent expenditures, coordination 
laws118 serve as the only line of defense in preventing outside groups from 
making “disguised contributions” to candidates.119 Yet, the real-world 
application of this new spending paradigm manifests that the current 
coordination laws are far from ideal. Despite the coordination ban, 
candidates have grown increasingly dependent and entwined with Super 
PACs. Take the following hypothetical: 
Suppose a candidate for Congress attends a fundraising 
event held by a Super PAC set up specifically to support 
(and which in practice only supports) that candidate. 
During the event, the candidate offers some brief 
welcoming remarks to the guests—most of whom have 
already contributed the maximum allowable amount of 
[$5400] directly to the candidate for that election. The 
candidate asks that each individual attendee make a $5000 
contribution—the maximum amount that an individual 
would be legally permitted to contribute to a PAC 
governed by traditional campaign finance limits—to the 
Super PAC, which the candidate says he hopes ‘will be 
used for a good cause.’ Two minutes later, the candidate 
leaves to attend another event; one of the organizers of the 
fundraising event, acting on behalf of the Super PAC, then 
asks that each attendee give $100,000 instead of $5000, 
to be put to the benefit of the candidate who just left the 
room.120 
While some may dismiss this arrangement as preposterous, it 
nevertheless seems common in the world of campaign finance; such an 
arrangement is entirely legal given that it is a “non-coordinated” political 
activity.121 As long as candidates and Super PACs are not formally 
                                                                                                             
117 “This basic notion of Super PACs as independent of candidates is becoming 
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“coordinating,” they are entitled to establish cordial working relationships. 
Given the recent trend of collaborative fundraising, the distinction 
between “coordinated” and “non-coordinated” political activities is further 
attenuated. In addition to allowing candidates attend Super PAC 
fundraisers, the FEC also permits the following: single-candidate Super 
PACs can be run by former staffers of the candidate; Super PACs and 
candidates can hire the same consultants; and Super PACs can run footage 
of candidates in their advertisements.122 Moreover, the FEC allows 
candidates and Super PACs to publicize their campaign plans over the 
Internet, which ultimately enables them to share strategies with one 
another.123 Perhaps the greatest enigma is the FEC’s recent stance on 
closed-door meetings between candidates and Super PACs. The FEC 
recently issued an advisory opinion that gave permission to candidates to 
meet privately with just one other wealthy donor and one Super PAC 
representative to discuss fundraising—further eroding the boundaries 
between candidates and allied Super PACs.124 Acknowledging the 
increased collaboration between candidates and Super PACs, a former 
chairman of the FEC concedes, “Super PACs are essentially another bank 
account for candidates—one that, because of Citizens United, can accept 
unlimited money.”125 Nevertheless, the increased collaboration between 
candidates and Super PACs is legal, and thus, Congress must pass a new 
law if it intends to hinder such collaboration. 
As Super PACs continue to garner more influence, outspend 
candidates, and ultimately do the heavy lifting, campaign efforts to 
circumvent the coordination laws will continue to be aggressive. Such a 
notion is emblematic of Jeb Bush’s 2016 presidential campaign, which 
exploited another loophole in the coordination laws. While many 
candidates tend to have informal connections with Super PACs, Jeb Bush 
has enjoyed an even closer structural relationship with his allied Super 
PAC, “Right to Rise.”126 Prior to officially announcing his 2016 
                                                                                                             
122 Pursley, supra note 49, at 817-18. 
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presidential bid, Jeb Bush ostensibly worked alongside Right to Rise and 
spearheaded the committee’s fundraising efforts, accumulating enough 
money to run a competitive campaign.127 By delaying his formal 
announcement of candidacy for President, Jeb Bush strategically 
circumvented the “hard money” campaign contribution limits imposed on 
all presidential candidates.128 Given that the coordination laws apply solely 
between Super PACs and a candidate’s official campaign, Bush was 
legally permitted to solicit unlimited funds for his allied Super PAC 
because he had not yet announced his formal candidacy—even though it 
was clear that Bush was vying for the Republican nomination.129 Indeed, 
the “candidate” label is what triggers the coordination laws from taking 
effect, and by pretending to “test the waters” and contemplate announcing 
his candidacy, Bush was able to effectually expose a loophole in the 
coordination laws and collude with Right to Rise.130 Accordingly, by 
delaying his formal announcement, Bush gave himself more time to 
coordinate with Right to Rise and develop a strategy for how it will later 
spend money on his behalf.131 Although Bush suspended his 2016 
presidential campaign, his fundraising tactics are likely to be mimicked by 
future candidates seeking to raise unlimited funds, which would make it 
even more difficult to police the coordination laws—and would be 
counterintuitive to the Court’s determination that Super PACs operate 
independently of candidates.132 
As Jeb Bush’s campaign demonstrates, Super PACs are increasingly 
functioning as an arm of a candidate’s campaign. Candidates are now 
outsourcing ordinary campaign tasks to Super PACs; the outsourcing of 
such tasks is legal, and thus, Congress must pass new legislation if it 
intends to prevent the delegation of campaign tasks to Super PACs. 
Accordingly, Super PACs now control advertising, direct mailing, and 
voter registration, all of which are tasks that a candidate’s campaign would 
frequently handle.133 Viewed in this light, how are Super PACs 
functionally any different from traditional PACs? Indeed, there is a 
growing sentiment that single-candidate Super PACs now serve as the 
                                                                                                             
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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virtual, but legally far less encumbered, alter egos of candidates.134 This 
notion presupposes that committees are “organized to back a specific 
candidate or [are] formed at the behest of party leaders.”135 Given that 
these alter ego Super PACs continue to function as extensions of 
candidates’ campaigns, there is a growing belief that contributions made 
to these candidate-specific Super PACs should be treated as “disguised 
contributions” to candidates.136 As a result of the FEC’s paralysis, the only 
conceivable way to effectively deter coordination between candidates and 
their alter ego Super PACs is for Congress to take action.137 
Single-candidate Super PACs, or “alter ego” Super PACs, are not the 
only type of Super PACs created. Rather, as the 2012 Presidential Election 
demonstrated, Super PACs can be divided into two broad categories: (1) 
the aforementioned alter ego Super PACs, and (2) shadow party 
organizations.138 The latter type of Super PAC essentially supplanted 527 
organizations, which were interest groups organized under Section 527 of 
the Internal Revenue Code—thus granted tax-exempt status—and were 
run by party insiders who broadly served their respective party’s campaign 
agenda.139 Like the alter ego Super PACs, shadow party Super PACs can 
collect unlimited contributions and engage in independent expenditures.140 
Whereas alter ego Super PACS serve a more prominent role in the 
primaries, shadow party Super PACs take center stage during the general 
election.141 Nevertheless, shadow party Super PACs provide candidates 
with another vehicle to circumvent campaign contribution limits. Not only 
are shadow party Super PACs tasked with collecting donations outside of 
the contribution limits imposed on candidates, but they also engage in 
“election activity short of express advocacy, including voter registration, 
get-out-the-vote efforts, and issue advocacy in support of their party.”142 
Despite the fact that the shadow party Super PACs’ spending on “issue 
                                                                                                             
134 See Michael S. Kang, The Year of the Super Pac, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1919 
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advocacy” and voter mobilization directly benefits candidates, the 
committees’ fundraising activities continue to be perceived as non-
coordinated. Moreover, given that shadow party Super PACS are entities 
formally distanced from a candidate, they are “able to attack the 
candidate’s opponent without any worries about public blowback and the 
Super PACs’ long-term reputation.”143 As such, shadow party Super PACs 
“serve as the attack arm of negative advertising for candidates without the 
countervailing deterrent of reputational accountability144 that holds back 
candidates and parties.” 
In addition to the emergence of alter ego and shadow party Super 
PACs, Citizens United has also led to the emergence of 501(c) “dark 
money” groups.145 Although these politically active nonprofit groups are 
distinct from Super PACs, they have provided the means to allow Super 
PACs to circumvent the leniently enforced disclosure requirements. 
Unlike alter ego and shadow party Super PACs, candidates cannot raise 
money on behalf of 501(c) groups.146 Nevertheless, because 501(c) groups 
must have a “primary purpose” other than electoral activity, they are 
exempt from any FECA restrictions on the donations they receive; thus, 
they are not required to disclose their donors to the public.147 Not only can 
these 501(c) groups accept unlimited donations and protect their donors’ 
identities, but also, more profoundly, they may transfer their money to 
ideologically affiliated Super PACs to spend—thus avoiding the “primary 
purpose” restriction.148 In effect, this enables Super PACs to keep the 
names of the donors hidden from the public. By virtue of transferring funds 
from 501(c) “dark money” groups to Super PACs, Super PACs easily 
circumvent the federal disclosure requirements. This dynamic relationship 
between Super PACs and 501(c) groups explains why “less than half of 
the independent expenditures by outside groups during the 2010 election 
cycle were made with disclosure of the contributors’ identities.”149 
Moreover, the collusion between Super PACs and 501(c) groups illustrates 
that, in addition to the coordination laws, there is a blatant loophole in the 
disclosure rules as well—further reinforcing the notion that the limitations 
placed on Super PACs are futile. Suffice it to say, the vast influence that 
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Super PACs have on campaigns is the by-product of the deficient 
coordination and disclosure laws. 
B. A State of Flux: Why Have Campaign Finance Offenses Not 
Been Enforced? 
Despite the Justice Department’s recent prosecution of a Virginia 
campaign operative for illegal coordination, there remains a paucity of 
cases involving campaign finance violations.150 Meanwhile, Senator 
Bernie Sanders came away unscathed after using campaign donations to 
pay his wife and daughter over $400,000 as campaign staff members.151 
Unsurprisingly, Senator Sanders’ aforementioned expenditures 
contravene the laws governing the permitted uses of campaign funds.152 
Such expenditures are in fact overt attempts to convert contributions to 
personal use—which are direct violations of the law.153 It seems 
commonplace nowadays for candidates to allocate campaign funds in an 
improper manner analogous to Senator Sanders, and despite such 
malfeasance, candidates continue to evade civil and criminal liability.154 
Correspondingly, the widespread cooperation between candidates, 
Super PACs, and 501(c) groups exemplifies that the parties unhesitatingly 
believe that they will avoid sanctions for subverting campaign 
contribution limits. Given the FEC’s failure to hold candidates 
accountable, candidates seemingly have grown apathetic towards 
complying with contribution laws. Former Arkansas Governor Mike 
Huckabee kicked off his 2016 presidential bid by asking his constituents 
for $1 million donations, a clear violation of the $2,700 contribution limit 
imposed on presidential primary election candidates.155 Election abuses 
have become so prevalent that the FEC chairman admits, “[t]he likelihood 
of the laws being enforced is slim . . . .People think the FEC is 
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dysfunctional. It’s worse than dysfunctional.”156 This begs the question: 
given the emphasis placed on preserving the integrity of the democratic 
process, why has our government demonstrated such incompetency with 
respect to enforcing the campaign contribution laws? Viewed more 
narrowly, why has the government failed to detect campaign offenses that 
resemble bribery and extortion? 
There are ultimately two reasons as to why legal authorities have only 
sparingly detected campaign offenses resembling bribery and extortion.157 
First off, legal action against bribery and extortion results in a conflict of 
interest and prolonged political deadlock, as “agents of one group of 
politicians (the executive branch) . . . prosecute another group (the 
legislative branch), in a prosecution to be adjudicated by a third group (the 
judiciary) typically appointed by the first (the executive).”158 Perhaps more 
profoundly, however, the FEC is also frequently paralyzed by deadlock 
due to the Republican-Democrat partisan split among the FEC’s six 
commissioners.159 Consequently, the FEC is disinclined to pursue an 
enforcement action, and instead allows the exposed politician to retire 
without facing any consequences.160 
The second—and perhaps more significant—reason for the 
government’s inaction is “the similarity between illegal bribery/extortion 
payments and ordinary, quite legal political contributions.”161 This reason 
is what ultimately makes rent creation and rent extraction so easy to 
practice without fear of being held accountable.162  Under the Hobbs Act, 
in order to prosecute a candidate for accepting large contributions, there 
must be an “explicit quid pro quo” agreement with the contributors.163 In 
McCormick v. U.S., the Court held that federal prosecutors could convict 
public officials under the Hobbs Act “for acting ‘under color of official 
right’ in accepting payments that are made in return for an ‘explicit 
promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an 
official act.’”164 Even in full compliance with the standard set forth in 
McCormick, however, public officials could still seek bribes without 
violating the Hobbs Act so long as there is no explicit quid pro quo 
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arrangement.165 Indeed, courts have held that “wink and nod” relationships 
between candidates and donors do not constitute a violation of the public 
corruption statutes.166 Given both the lack of any incriminating paper trail 
left behind as well as the lack of any remedies available to address implicit 
quid pro quo agreements, simple “wink and nod” relationships enable 
candidates to easily evade civil and criminal liability.167 
In the absence of an explicit agreement or promise, campaign 
contributions ultimately function as “implicit bribes.”168 Under 
McCormick, however, federal prosecutors cannot bring charges against 
candidates for implicit bribery involving campaign contributions—despite 
the subtle practical distinction between implicit and explicit agreements.169 
Meanwhile, with respect to explicit agreements, the courts have been split 
on what exactly constitutes an “explicit” quid pro quo arrangement; 
therefore, the courts have struggled with interpreting “explicit” quid pro 
quo violations of the Hobbs Act in the context of campaign 
contributions.170 The unsettled nature of the law in this area has 
consequently created a disincentive for the FEC to pursue enforcement 
actions against candidates.171 
V. POST-SCALIA: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
From the false dichotomy between contributions and expenditures, to 
the loophole-ridden coordination and disclosure laws governing Super 
PACs, to the “non-candidate” status exploited by Jeb Bush’s campaign, to 
the FEC’s paralysis, to the lack of remedies available to deter implicit quid 
pro quo agreements, the campaign finance system is in need of overhaul, 
especially in the context of campaign contributions. All of these 
deficiencies effectually allow candidates to bypass the contribution limits 
with ease. In light of the circumvention of contribution limits and the 
infusion of big money into the political process, public cynicism toward 
the integrity of the democratic process continues to grow.172 The public 
                                                                                                             
165 See id. at 1444-45. 
166 See Jordan, supra note 48, at 1436. 
167 See Jordan, supra note 48, at 1448. 
168 See id. 
169 See Jordan, supra note 48, at 1446. 
170 See Jordan, supra note 48, at 1443. 
171 “We’re not interested in going after people unless the law is fairly clear, and we’re 
not willing to take the law beyond where it’s written.” Lichtblau, supra note 156 (quoting 
FEC Commissioner Caroline Hunter). 
172 Surveys have revealed staggering statistics about the public’s distrust in the 
government. In November 2015, only 19% of the survey participants expressed trust in the 
government—a historic low. See Samantha Smith, 6 key takeaways about how Americans 
view their government, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.pewresearch
2016-2017] TURNING CASH INTO VOTES 135 
 
cynicism is driven by the appearance of corruption, largely in part because 
the American media has perpetuated images of candidates as self-
interested wrongdoers who can be bought.173 
Given the practical flaws in the campaign finance system as well as 
the public’s growing distrust, why have previous reform efforts been so 
ineffective? In short, the First Amendment poses a major impediment to 
any reform efforts. Because contributions are treated as a form of speech, 
the Court will only amend the contribution laws if a sufficiently 
compelling governmental interest is implicated.174 Thus far, only one 
reason has been found sufficiently important to justify amending the 
limits: preventing quid pro quo corruption, or its appearance.175 While the 
concept of quid pro quo corruption seems fairly straightforward, the Court 
has never been precise about the meaning of the appearance of 
corruption.176 Nevertheless, given the Court’s narrow definition of 
“corruption,” Congress may only target a specific type of corruption—
quid pro quo corruption.177 “[B]ecause the Government’s interest in 
preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may not seek to 
limit the appearance of mere influence or access.”178 The implications of 
the Court’s narrow definition of “corruption” seem quite apparent: the 
First Amendment protects anything short of outright bribery, including 
influence and access. Moreover, in light of the fact that the Court has found 
only one compelling reason to justify amending the contribution limits, the 
question becomes: where do campaign finance reform efforts go from 
here? 
First and foremost, the implications of Justice Scalia’s death should be 
contemplated through the lens of campaign finance reform. In Citizens 
United, the Court’s conservative majority asserted itself, striking down the 
limits placed on independent expenditures in a 5-4 vote.179 More 
profoundly, the majority’s strong pro-First Amendment stance reflected in 
the decision seems to have sparked negative unintended consequences, 
including the spawn of Super PACs. What was the underlying reason for 
the Court striking down the provision of the BCRA that limited 
                                                                                                             
.org/fact-tank/2015/11/23/6-key-takeaways-about-how-americans-view-their-govern
ment/. 
173 See Jordan, supra note 48, at 1435. 
174 See James Bopp, Jr., Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11 
REGENT U. L. REV. 235 (1999). 
175 See id. 
176 See POST, supra note 16. 
177 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1438 (2014). 
178 Id. at 1434. 
179 See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
136 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:111 
 
independent expenditures? In a nutshell, the BCRA provision was not 
invalidated on the basis of precedent, but rather was invalidated because it 
was inconsistent with the Court’s political and ideological proclivities. 
The Court in Citizens United overturned precedent set forth in Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which allowed restrictions on corporate 
campaign spending.180 In light of the conservative majority’s lack of 
commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis, the five conservative Supreme 
Court justices have garnered criticism for acting disingenuously in their 
handling of the case.181 
In addition to being a staunch conservative and an unrelenting 
defender of free speech, Justice Scalia was also the longest-serving justice 
on the Supreme Court and its leading conservative voice. In the wake of 
his death, it is now possible that the pendulum will begin to swing away 
from the Court’s absolutist view of the First Amendment in the context of 
campaign finance. If Scalia is eventually replaced with a liberal justice, it 
seemingly becomes more likely that the Court will strike more of a balance 
between the competing constitutional interests at stake—free speech vs. 
the compelling governmental interest in curbing corruption. Perhaps a 5-4 
liberal majority would view corporate money as a threat to the integrity of 
the electoral process. 
In any event, if a liberal justice were appointed as the replacement for 
Justice Scalia, it seems likely that the Court would revisit and perhaps 
overrule Citizens United, provided that a case challenging the decision is 
brought before the Court.182 As recently set forth in Johnson v. U.S., “[t]he 
doctrine of stare decisis allows [the Court] to revisit an earlier decision 
where experience with its application reveals that it is unworkable.”183 
Indeed, “even decisions rendered after full adversarial presentation may 
have to yield to the lessons of subsequent experience.”184 Although the 
Court made a good faith effort to prevent coordination and promote 
transparency in its Citizens United ruling, the practical effect seems to be 
increased coordination and exponential growth in dark money—a major 
paradigm shift. Because of Citizens United, donors ostensibly use Super 
PACs as a vehicle to circumvent the contribution limits placed on 
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candidates. Given the decision’s seemingly perverse consequences and 
practical unworkability, the Court may become more inclined to revisit 
Citizens United. 
Assuming the Court does revisit Citizens United, there are two 
alternative approaches the Court can take, upon review, to combat the 
influence of dark money on elections. To preface, unless the Court changes 
its position and holds that the government has no anti-corruption interest 
in limiting campaign contributions, or alternatively the government has an 
anti-corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures, the First 
Amendment, as currently interpreted, remains an impediment to the 
implementation of either approach. Correspondingly, a potential criticism 
of the two proposed solutions is that they arguably presuppose that 
influence is tantamount to corruption; such criticism assumes that 
disproportionate political influence is not necessarily a bad thing.185 
Despite potential criticism, the aim of both approaches is to achieve a level 
playing field between candidates and Super PACs.186 In an effort to 
achieve this objective, the proposed approaches seek to strike more of a 
balance between the two competing constitutional interests at stake: an 
individual’s right to engage in political speech as opposed to the public’s 
interest in “collective speech,” which involves the government’s anti-
corruption interest.187 To strike such a balance, the Court would seemingly 
have to change its position on whether the First Amendment allows a 
broader definition of “corruption.”188 Although the Court currently 
acknowledges “quid pro quo corruption” as the only true form of 
“corruption,” it seems that the solicitation of large contributions in 
exchange for political favors, or to avoid political disfavors, poses the 
same danger of drowning out the voices of the many.189 Indeed, 
broadening the definition of “corruption” to include influence and access 
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is not unprecedented, as demonstrated by the Court’s decision in 
McConnell.190 
Turning to the first approach, the Court can choose to limit 
contributions made to Super PACs in the same manner it limits direct 
contributions made to candidates—a return to the pre-Citizens United 
campaign finance regime. This approach recognizes that large 
independent expenditures may indeed give rise to the appearance of 
corruption.191 Such a judicial interpretation assumes that contributions 
made to Super PACs would be subject to the intermediate scrutiny 
standard.192 In the interest of protecting “collective speech,”193 this 
approach restricts corporate campaign spending in an effort to combat the 
distorting effect of independent expenditures on the political process. 
From a practical standpoint, bids for political favors, or to avoid political 
disfavors, would be constrained, and thus, there would seemingly be less 
money flowing through the electoral process. While “[f]avoritism and 
influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics,”194 candidates 
may be less inclined to coordinate with Super PACs given the diminished 
financial incentive. In essence, this approach is another form of 
governmental price-fixing. 
Alternatively, the second approach the Court can take is to strike down 
the caps placed on direct contributions to candidates, ultimately abolishing 
contribution limits altogether. Applying the same reasoning used by the 
Court in Citizens United with respect to independent expenditures, 
limiting the amount an individual may give to a candidate imposes a direct 
restraint on his or her political speech—a view that is in accord with 
Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion in McCutcheon.195 This judicial 
interpretation assumes that contribution limits would be subject to the 
same strict scrutiny as other forms of speech.196 At first such a proposal 
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may seem facetious, as it amounts to “fighting fire with fire.”197 From a 
practical standpoint, however, the current contribution limits are simply 
unrealistic given the steep cost of running a competitive campaign. 
Moreover, lifting the contribution limits may create greater transparency 
and accountability because less money would be siphoned away from 
candidates and into dark money groups, likely resulting in a more 
informed electorate. Because less money would be siphoned away from 
candidates and into special interest groups, corporations would seemingly 
become less likely to wield disproportionate influence over candidates. 
Although the lifting of contribution caps may infuse more money into the 
electoral process, donations would theoretically be distributed more 
proportionally between candidates and special interest groups. Given that 
the electoral process is already flooded with money, though, would large 
direct contributions really appear to have a corrupting effect?198 At the 
very least, dismantling the contribution limits placed on candidates would 
theoretically give those who contribute directly to candidates the same 
freedom as those who spend money independently, creating a system that 
seems no worse than the current one. 
On balance, the two proposed approaches—despite disparate 
methodologies—theoretically could generate the same outcome: a level 
playing field between candidates and Super PACs. However, on the flip 
side, the Court may face the same quandary it faced in Citizens Untied 
with respect to its commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis. After all, 
both of the proposed solutions—placing contribution caps on Super PACs, 
or alternatively repealing the contribution caps placed on direct 
contributions to candidates—would require the Court to overturn its own 
precedent set in Citizens United. As such, to avoid another outright 
rejection of the doctrine of stare decisis, perhaps the Court should instead 
take a more pragmatic approach and defer to Congress’ lawmaking power. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As it currently stands, both Congress and the Court seem inclined to 
defer to the FEC with respect to dealing with election abuses. Without 
reform, however, candidates face no credible threat of prosecution for 
election abuses, and thus, it seems that their behavior will continue to 
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resemble the corrupt practices of bribery and extortion. In an effort to 
obtain positive economic profits, donors will likely comply with the 
candidates’ demands—either to gain political favors or to avoid political 
disfavors, as demonstrated by the application of the rent creation and rent 
extraction economic models. Correspondingly, in an effort to raise enough 
money to run competitive campaigns, candidates will continue to become 
increasingly reliant on, and entwined with Super PACs—an arrangement 
that seemingly enables the parties to legally circumvent campaign 
contribution caps, essentially rendering the contribution limits 
meaningless. The residual effect of the Super PACs’ influence on elections 
appears to be the further erosion of the public’s trust and confidence in the 
political process. In light of the negative practical consequences of the 
Citizens United decision, it seems prudent for the Court to defer to 
Congress on the issue of how to regulate campaign contributions. 
 
